IO v European Investment Bank (T-199/25)

JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (Third Chamber)

21 October 2026 (*)

( Civil service – EIB staff – Psychological harassment – Dignity at Work Policy – Complaint alleging psychological harassment – Decision rejecting the complaint – Prima facie evidence of the alleged psychological harassment – Liability – Non-material damage )

In Case T‑199/25,

IO, represented by L. Levi and A. Champetier, lawyers,

applicant,

v

European Investment Bank (EIB), represented by A. García Sánchez, acting as Agent, and by A. Guillerme and S. Napolitano, lawyers,

defendant,

THE GENERAL COURT (Third Chamber),

composed of K. Kowalik-Bańczyk (Rapporteur), President, H. Cassagnabère and T. Pavelin, Judges,

Registrar: T. Henze, Acting Registrar,

having regard to the written part of the procedure,

having regard to the fact that no request for a hearing was submitted by the parties within three weeks after service of notification of the close of the written part of the procedure, and having decided to rule on the action without an oral part of the procedure, pursuant to Article 106(3) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court,

gives the following

Judgment

1        By his action under Article 270 TFEU and Article 50a of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the applicant, IO, seeks, first, annulment of the decision of the European Investment Bank (EIB) of 16 December 2024 rejecting his complaint of psychological harassment against one of his colleagues (‘the contested decision’) and, second, compensation for the non-material damage which he claims to have suffered as a result of the adoption of that decision.

 Background to the dispute

2        The applicant is a member of staff of the EIB performing the duties of [confidential]. He and another [confidential] (‘the second [confidential]’) have been working in the same division since 1 March 2022.

3        On 5 July 2024, the applicant submitted a complaint pursuant to Article 21.1 of the EIB Dignity at Work Policy (‘the Dignity at Work Policy’). In his complaint, the applicant alleged 19 facts constituting, in his view, psychological harassment by the second [confidential].

4        By decision of 22 July 2024, the EIB reassigned the applicant to another division of the same department, with effect from 1 September 2024.

5        By email of 25 July 2024, the EIB asked the applicant questions relating to the confidential treatment of certain documents contained in his complaint. The applicant replied to those questions on the same day.

6        By letter of 8 October 2024, the EIB informed the applicant of its intention to reject his complaint as inadmissible on the basis of Article 22.2(d) of the Dignity at Work Policy on the ground that that complaint did not contain prima facie evidence of the alleged psychological harassment.

7        By email of 17 November 2024, the applicant asked the EIB to take into account a twentieth fact, which occurred on 13 November 2024, in order to establish the psychological harassment of which he considered himself to be the victim.

8        By the contested decision, the EIB rejected the applicant’s complaint as inadmissible on the basis of Article 22.2(d) of the Dignity at Work Policy on the ground that that complaint did not contain prima facie evidence of the alleged psychological harassment.

 Forms of order sought

9        The applicant claims that the Court should:

–        annul the contested decision;

–        order the EIB to compensate him in the amount of EUR 20 000 for the non-material damage he claims to have suffered;

–        order the EIB to pay the costs.

10      The EIB contends that the Court should:

–        dismiss the action;

–        order the applicant to pay the costs.

 Law

11      In support of the action, the applicant raises, in essence, four pleas in law alleging (i) infringement of Article 22.3 of the Dignity at Work Policy, (ii) infringement of Article 16.1 of that policy, (iii) infringement of Article 1.1(a) of that policy, and (iv) breach of the duty to provide assistance and of the duty of care.

 First plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 22.3 of the Dignity at Work Policy

12      By his first plea, the applicant submits that, after providing, on 25 July 2024, the clarifications relating to his complaint requested by the EIB, the EIB should have adopted the contested decision within 20 working days. He states that that decision was taken almost five months after that date.

13      The EIB disputes the applicant’s arguments.

14      Article 22.3 of the Dignity at Work Policy provides that the decision to reject a complaint as inadmissible or manifestly unfounded is to be rendered within 20 working days from the lodging of the complaint.

15      However, even if such a period were mandatory, it is in any event a matter of principle that a procedural irregularity will entail the annulment of a decision in whole or in part only if it is shown that in the absence of such irregularity the decision being challenged might have been substantively different (judgments of 23 April 1986, Bernardi v Parliament, 150/84, EU:C:1986:167, paragraph 28, and of 11 March 2020, Commission v Gmina Miasto Gdynia and Port Lotniczy Gdynia Kosakowo, C‑56/18 P, EU:C:2020:192, paragraph 80).

16      In the present case, it should be noted that the failure to comply with the time limit laid down in Article 22.3 of the Dignity at Work Policy, relied on by the applicant, had no effect on the facts described in his complaint and, therefore, was not such as to influence the way in which those facts would be assessed in the light of the concept of psychological harassment. Moreover, as is apparent from paragraph 7 above, that failure even enabled the applicant to further substantiate the complaint by referring to an event that occurred after the expiry of the time limit in question.

17      Consequently, it should be noted that, in the present case, the failure to comply with the time limit laid down in Article 22.3 of the Dignity at Work Policy was not such as to affect the EIB’s finding that the applicant’s complaint was not accompanied by prima facie evidence of the alleged psychological harassment. It must therefore be held that this failure to meet the deadline was not, in itself, capable of altering the substance of the contested decision.

18      The applicant’s first plea in law must therefore be rejected.

 Second plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 16.1 of the Dignity at Work Policy

19      By his second plea, the applicant submits that the mediation procedure was no longer an option after he had lodged his complaint under Article 21 of the Dignity at Work Policy. He infers from this that the EIB incorrectly considered that it was appropriate to ‘take note of the fact that [he] [had] agreed to start a mediation with [the second [confidential]]’.

20      The EIB disputes the applicant’s arguments.

21      In that regard, it must be borne in mind that the grounds of a decision may be subject to judicial review by the Courts of the European Union only to the extent that they constitute the essential basis for the operative part of that decision (order of 28 January 2004, Netherlands v Commission, C‑164/02, EU:C:2004:54, paragraph 21).

22      In the present case, it should be noted that the assertions in the contested decision that the EIB, first, took note of the fact that the applicant had agreed to participate in a mediation with the second [confidential] and, second, hoped that that mediation would improve their relationship are not grounds which support the operative part of that decision. The EIB rejected the applicant’s complaint not because of the initiation of a mediation procedure, but because of the lack of prima facie evidence of the alleged psychological harassment under Article 22.2(d) of the Dignity at Work Policy. Additionally, it must be held that the statements in question are not contained in the part of that decision entitled ‘Statement of reasons’.

23      In those circumstances, it must be held that, even if it were established, the fact that the mediation procedure could no longer be initiated after the applicant’s complaint was lodged has no bearing on the legality of the contested decision.

24      Consequently, the applicant’s second plea in law must be rejected as ineffective.

 Third plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 1.1(a) of the Dignity at Work Policy

25      By his third plea, the applicant criticises the EIB for having considered that he had not adduced prima facie evidence of the psychological harassment which he alleges.

26      The EIB disputes the applicant’s arguments.

27      Under Article 1.1 of the Dignity at Work Policy, psychological harassment means any improper and unwanted conduct that takes place over a period of time, is repetitive or systematic and involves physical behaviour, spoken or written language, gestures or other intentional acts that may undermine the personality, dignity or physical or psychological integrity of any person. That provision also states that conduct may be classified as harassment even if it was not committed with the deliberate intention of causing harm, provided that it was not accidental and objectively led to discrediting the alleged victim or impaired the latter’s working conditions.

28      In addition, Article 22.2(d) of the Dignity at Work Policy provides that the complaint lodged by the person who considers that he or she has been or continues to be subject to harassment is to be rejected as inadmissible or manifestly unfounded where it contains no prima facie evidence indicating that the alleged harassment took place.

29      Furthermore, Article 9.1 of the Dignity at Work Policy specifies that prima facie evidence consists of evidence of a fact that is of sufficient weight to justify a reasonable inference of its existence but does not amount to conclusive evidence of that fact.

30      It must be held that the concept of ‘conduct’, within the meaning of Article 1.1(a) of the Dignity at Work Policy, is defined broadly and generically. It is thus capable of covering not only active conduct, but also passive conduct, such as marginalising or excluding a member of staff in his or her workplace and in the employment relationship, or even a failure to act (see, by analogy, judgment of 16 April 2026, Colombani v EEAS (Passive or collective harassment), C‑343/23 P, EU:C:2026:294, paragraphs 30 and 32).

31      However, the fact of having difficult, or even conflictual, relations with colleagues or hierarchical superiors does not in itself constitute evidence of psychological harassment (see, by analogy, judgment of 16 April 2008, Microsoft v Commission, T‑486/04, EU:T:2008:111, paragraph 61). In order to be classified as harassment, the conduct complained of must be ‘improper’, in the sense that an impartial and reasonable observer, of normal sensitivity and placed in the same conditions, would consider the conduct in question to be excessive and open to criticism (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgments of 13 July 2018, Curto v Parliament, T‑275/17, EU:T:2018:479, paragraph 78 and the case-law cited, and of 24 September 2025, KF v EIB, T‑222/24, not published, EU:T:2025:905, paragraph 37).

32      Thus, negative comments addressed to a member of staff do not necessarily undermine his or her personality, dignity or physical or psychological integrity in so far as they are formulated in measured terms and it is not apparent from the case file that they are based on allegations that are unfair and have no connection with objective facts (see, by analogy, judgments of 6 April 2022, KU v EEAS, T‑425/20, not published, EU:T:2022:224, paragraph 122, and of 24 February 2010, Menghi v ENISA, F‑2/09, EU:F:2010:12, paragraph 110). Consequently, irrespective of the subjective perception which that member of staff may have had of the facts which he or she alleges, he or she must put forward a body of evidence capable of establishing that he or she has been subjected to conduct which has led, objectively, to discrediting him or her or to impairing his or her working conditions (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 23 February 2001, De Nicola v EIB, T‑7/98, T‑208/98 and T‑109/99, EU:T:2001:69, paragraph 286).

33      It is therefore necessary to ascertain whether, in finding that the facts relied on by the applicant were not accompanied by  prima facie  evidence in the light of the definition of psychological harassment referred to in Article 1.1 of the Dignity at Work Policy, the EIB made errors of assessment.

34      In that regard, in the first place, the applicant identifies several occasions during which the second [confidential], first, sought to isolate him professionally and, second, did not respect the division of tasks incumbent on them.

35      More specifically, the applicant observes that the second [confidential] encouraged some of the EIB staff to contact him, rather than the applicant, in order to obtain [confidential] advice. Furthermore, the second [confidential] failed to invite the applicant to meetings aimed, first, at organising the work amongst the assistants in their department following the departure of one of them and, second, at providing those assistants with training relating to [confidential]. Nor did he invite the applicant to take part in the preparation of a presentation relating to the organisation of the work of those assistants which he was to deliver to the management team.

36      As is apparent from paragraph 30 above, passive conduct, such as marginalising or excluding a member of staff in employment relationships, is capable of falling within the concept of psychological harassment, as defined in Article 1.1 of the Dignity at Work Policy.

37      However, first, it should be noted that it is not apparent from the documents produced by the applicant that the second [confidential] objectively engaged in improper conduct within the meaning of the case-law referred to in paragraph 31 above, leading to the marginalisation or exclusion of the applicant in his employment relationships.

38      The fact that the second [confidential] informed his colleagues that he was their ‘man’ if they encountered [confidential] issues and that they could contact him directly in order to find a solution suggests, above all, that the second [confidential] was keen to assist those colleagues. Furthermore, the applicant has not submitted any argument capable of establishing that his relations or his work with the assistants in the department concerned had been adversely affected by the fact that the second [confidential] had become involved in organising the work of those assistants following the departure of one of them and that he had undertaken to provide training to them. In those circumstances, and in the absence of further details, it must be held that such a fact would at most be such as to establish that the second [confidential] was committed to his work. Similarly, the fact, relied on by the applicant, that the second [confidential] made a presentation to the management team appears to be primarily a matter for that team to decide and could result from its desire to recognise the commitment he had shown in his work.

39      Second, the fact that the second [confidential] was called upon more frequently than the applicant by EIB staff and the management team cannot, in itself, be regarded as sufficient to establish that the said [confidential]’s conduct was improper. Similarly, the steps taken by the second [confidential] without proactively involving the applicant cannot be interpreted as a mark of mistrust or an attempt to discredit him, but should rather be seen as evidence of his active involvement within the department.

40      In the second place, the applicant complains that the second [confidential] interrupted him during a meeting, sent him an email during his sick leave and attempted to establish a hierarchy between them.

41      However, first, the mere fact that the second [confidential] expressed reservations during a meeting on the usefulness of giving a presentation to all those attending that meeting appears to fall within the scope of team work and the legitimate aim of making the best possible use of everyone’s time.

42      Second, although the second [confidential] sent an email to the applicant whilst he was on sick leave, it should be noted that he did not, however, ask him to work whilst on leave. He expressly took note of the applicant’s sick leave and merely asked him to set aside some time on his return to review certain documents and provide comments on them.

43      In addition, it should be noted that the second [confidential] had set the same deadline for all members of the division to provide such comments, whilst specifying that it would also be possible to take into account comments received after that date, given that the documents in question were to be regularly updated. Consequently, the applicant cannot seriously criticise the second [confidential] for having sought to establish a hierarchical relationship by requiring him to provide comments specifically on the day of his return to work. On the contrary, it is apparent from the emails from the second [confidential] that he wished to benefit from the ‘professional expertise and experience’ of both the applicant and his colleagues, taking into account their comments, including, where appropriate, whether those comments were made after the deadline he had set for the whole division.

44      Third, the fact that the second [confidential] asked an assistant to approach the applicant in order to send a document before a given date cannot be interpreted as an indication that he intended ‘indirectly’ to exercise hierarchical authority over the applicant. The applicant remained free, as the case may be, to inform that assistant that he could not assist him within the time frame indicated by the second [confidential].

45      In those circumstances, it must be held that the conduct of the second [confidential] did not exceed the limits of team work and cannot be regarded as improper.

46      In the third place, the applicant criticises the second [confidential] for having suggested that he was unable to carry out a certain task and that he was reluctant to take responsibility. He also criticises him for having made unfounded and unsubstantiated criticisms of his work.

47      However, first, contrary to what the applicant claims, it is not apparent from the documents produced by him that the second [confidential] had indicated that he was incapable of carrying out certain tasks. The fact that the second [confidential] offered advice on a case for which the applicant was responsible ‘in order to try to help’ the applicant cannot be interpreted as an indication that the applicant was incapable of carrying out the task required of him. Similarly, the fact that the second [confidential] invited the applicant to a meeting to discuss the specific comments he would like to receive from him concerning certain documents cannot be interpreted as an indication that the applicant was unable to provide such comments. On the contrary, it is clear from the annexes to the applicant’s complaint that the second [confidential] had expressly stated that he wished to draw on the applicant’s expertise and to benefit from his assistance in a spirit of cooperation and team work.

48      Second, it should be noted that the second [confidential] had indicated, in an email sent to their hierarchical superior, that he agreed to take sole responsibility for a document, given the applicant’s reluctance regarding its circulation. The fact that the applicant’s reluctance resulted from his wish to comply with the EIB Group Staff Code of Conduct is not such as to call into question the fact, noted in that email, that he did not wish to take responsibility for the circulation of that document. The email in question therefore merely described the situation as it was factually presented, without, however, criticising the applicant’s conduct.

49      Third, it must be held that the fact that the second [confidential] on four occasions made comments on the applicant’s work with which he disagreed is inherent in team work. Moreover, it follows from paragraph 32 above that the fact that the second [confidential] made negative comments on the applicant’s work cannot, in itself, constitute psychological harassment.

50      In that regard, first of all, it should be noted that, contrary to what the applicant claims without substantiating it, the second [confidential] made his comments in measured terms. In particular, first, in the email of 15 December 2023, the second [confidential] merely made a suggestion and explained why, in his view, it improved the document prepared by the applicant. Second, in the email of 20 March 2024, the second [confidential] merely raised the possibility of a misunderstanding and suggested that they discuss the matter in person.

51      Next, it should be noted that the criticisms made by the second [confidential] do not appear to be without a factual basis.

52      It should be noted that, in his email of 28 March 2024, the second [confidential] had specified the reason why he criticised the applicant for having circulated a document within the EIB without consulting him and without providing the necessary explanations to accompany that document. He had also set out the consequences that this circulation might have had on the recipients of the document in question, citing a specific example in that regard, and the manner in which he himself would have circulated the document in question.

53      First, the applicant acknowledges that he was responsible for the circulation of that document. He also acknowledges the existence of the example cited by the second [confidential] and does not dispute that it would have been at the very least conceivable to proceed in the manner suggested by the latter. Furthermore, the fact, relied on by the applicant, that he had not sought to conceal the circulation of the document in question from the second [confidential] is not such as to call into question the fact, noted by the latter, that he had not been consulted before that circulation. Consequently, contrary to what the applicant claims, that email was not without a factual basis.

54      Second, it should be noted that the email of 28 March 2024 was sufficiently substantiated to enable both the applicant to defend his action and his hierarchical superior to take any appropriate measures.

55      Lastly, the applicant cannot criticise the second [confidential] for having disparaged him in front of EIB staff members. In particular, as regards the meeting of 14 November 2023, the applicant asserts that the second [confidential] had criticised, in the presence of their hierarchical superior, a document which he had prepared, even though the second [confidential] had previously made no comments on that document when the applicant had asked him to do so. However, since the second [confidential] had no hierarchical relationship with the applicant, he was not prohibited from raising his disagreements with their hierarchical superior – all the more so in the applicant’s presence – so that the latter could, if necessary, decide on the appropriate measures.

56      Consequently, it must be held that the comments made by the second [confidential] concerning the applicant’s work cannot be regarded as improper, even if some of them criticised his colleague’s work.

57      In the fourth place, the applicant criticises the second [confidential] for having ‘continuously’ complained to their hierarchical superior. He states that he adduced prima facie evidence in that regard which could easily have been verified by the EIB.

58      However, it should be noted that it was the applicant’s hierarchical superior who informed him of the criticisms levelled against him by the second [confidential]. It is apparent from Annex 2 to the applicant’s complaint that the criticisms in question related to the meeting of 14 November 2023 and the email of 15 December 2023, referred to in paragraphs 50 and 55 above, but that that hierarchical superior did not understand the nature of their disagreement. Therefore, it must be held that, in the absence of further details, the second [confidential] levelled criticism at the applicant and informed their hierarchical superior of this. However, whilst this circumstance may, at most, indicate the existence of a disagreement or a rift between two colleagues, it cannot, on the other hand, constitute prima facie evidence that the second [confidential]’s conduct was improper within the meaning of the case-law referred to in paragraph 31 above. Consequently, the documents produced by the applicant in that regard cannot constitute prima facie evidence of the alleged psychological harassment.

59      In the fifth place, the applicant complains that the second [confidential] failed to observe his obligation of confidentiality by announcing on 13 November 2024 to some of their colleagues in various departments of the EIB that the applicant’s complaint was to be rejected and that the applicant would be reassigned again, this time to another department.

60      In that regard, Article 8.1 of the Dignity at Work Policy provides that EIB staff are obliged to observe ‘the strictest confidentiality regarding all aspects of the procedure’ initiated under the Dignity at Work Policy, although the alleged victim and the accused person may disclose the content of the final decision once it has been adopted.

61      Consequently, as the EIB acknowledged in the contested decision, the second [confidential] should have refrained, in accordance with the Dignity at Work Policy, from disclosing information to colleagues regarding the outcome of the complaint lodged by the applicant prior to the adoption of the contested decision. However, it should be noted that he could have disclosed that information after the adoption of that decision. Contrary to what the applicant claims, the fact that the second [confidential] disclosed that information approximately one month before the adoption of the decision in question was not such as to disparage him. Similarly, the fact that the second [confidential] referred to the reassignment of the applicant to another department, the confidential nature of which is not alleged, was also not such as to disparage him. In addition, those announcements, however premature and ill-advised they may have been, remained factual.

62      It follows from paragraphs 34 to 61 above that, irrespective of the applicant’s subjective perception of the facts on which he relies, those facts are at most capable of revealing the existence of a conflictual relationship between him and the second [confidential]. However, they cannot be regarded as capable of characterising improper conduct that takes place over a period of time, is repetitive or systematic and involves acts that may undermine the personality, dignity or physical or psychological integrity of the applicant.

63      In those circumstances, it should be noted that the EIB correctly considered that an impartial and reasonable observer, of normal sensitivity and placed in the same conditions as the applicant, could not consider that the conduct of the second [confidential], as described by the applicant, was capable of constituting psychological harassment. Thus, contrary to what the applicant claims, the documents produced by him seeking to establish the facts relating to that conduct cannot constitute prima facie evidence indicating that such harassment took place.

64      That conclusion cannot be called into question by the other arguments put forward by the applicant.

65      First of all, the applicant submits that the EIB did not actually carry out a comprehensive assessment of the evidence which he had produced, despite the assertion to the contrary contained in the contested decision. However, it is sufficient to note that the EIB considered that the allegations contained in the complaint did not constitute, individually and as a whole, prima facie evidence of the alleged psychological harassment. In particular, it considered that none of those allegations was sufficient to establish such harassment. In that regard, the applicant has failed to demonstrate how those allegations, even considered in the light of each other, should be interpreted as characterising, overall, prima facie evidence of psychological harassment.

66      Furthermore, the applicant claims that the EIB incorrectly took into account in the contested decision the absence of any intention to harm the second [confidential].

67      Admittedly, as has been noted in paragraph 27 above, Article 1.1 of the Dignity at Work Policy provides that conduct may be classified as harassment even if it was not deliberately intended to cause harm. However, it should be noted that the applicant himself, in his complaint, attributed malicious intent to the second [confidential]. It follows that the EIB cannot be criticised for having noted that the malicious intent alleged by the applicant had not been established for the purposes of rejecting his complaint. Furthermore, and in any event, the mere fact that the EIB noted that the second [confidential] had not deliberately intended to cause harm to the applicant cannot call into question the fact, also established in the contested decision, that the applicant’s complaint did not contain any prima facie evidence that the second [confidential]’s conduct was likely to constitute psychological harassment.

68      Lastly, the applicant argues, in essence, that the EIB is contradicting itself, since the EIB itself acknowledged the alleged harassment in its letter of 8 October 2024, in which it stated that it would remind the second [confidential] of his obligations under the EIB Group Staff Code of Conduct.

69      However, it is sufficient to note that, in its letter of 8 October 2024, the EIB had stated more specifically that, although the applicant had not produced any prima facie evidence of the alleged psychological harassment, it nevertheless intended to remind the second [confidential] of his duty to behave courteously and respectfully towards his colleagues, in accordance with the EIB Group Staff Code of Conduct. In those circumstances, as the EIB had expressly noted the absence of any prima facie evidence of such harassment, its letter cannot be interpreted as an acknowledgement of the existence of such harassment.

70      Consequently, the applicant’s third plea in law must be rejected.

 Fourth plea in law, alleging breach of the duty to provide assistance and of the duty of care

71      By his fourth plea, the applicant submits that the EIB infringed its duty to provide assistance and its duty of care by finding that the psychological harassment of which he considered himself to be the victim had not been established, whereas it should have conducted an investigation before reaching such a conclusion. He states in that regard that it was for him only to adduce prima facie evidence of that harassment in his complaint. He adds that the transfer he was granted with effect from 1 September 2024 was not sufficient to justify the rejection of his complaint.

72      The EIB disputes the applicant’s arguments.

73      As is apparent from paragraph 63 above, the facts alleged by the applicant in his complaint, even if they were established, were not capable of constituting psychological harassment, with the result that the documents produced by the applicant seeking to establish those facts did not constitute prima facie evidence of such harassment. Consequently, it must be noted that the EIB correctly considered that there was no need to open an investigation in order to establish the truth of the facts alleged by the applicant.

74      In those circumstances, the applicant is not justified in claiming that the EIB infringed its duty to provide assistance and its duty of care on the sole ground that it considered that he had not produced prima facie evidence of psychological harassment.

75      Furthermore, contrary to what the applicant claims, the EIB did not reject his complaint on the ground that he had been reassigned. Although the EIB stated in its letter of 8 October 2024 that it hoped that the applicant’s situation would improve, in view of his transfer to another division from 1 September 2024, it is expressly apparent from the contested decision that that complaint was rejected on the basis of Article 22.2(d) of the Dignity at Work Policy on the ground that the applicant had not adduced prima facie evidence of the alleged psychological harassment.

76      In those circumstances, the applicant’s fourth plea in law must be rejected.

77      Since the applicant has not established that the contested decision was vitiated by illegality, it must be held that he has also failed to establish that the EIB was at fault in rejecting his complaint without initiating a thorough inquiry. Consequently, both the first head of claim seeking annulment of that decision and the second head of claim seeking compensation for the damage allegedly suffered must be rejected and, consequently, the action must be dismissed in its entirety.

 Costs

78      Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, he must be ordered to bear his own costs and to pay those incurred by the EIB, in accordance with the form of order sought by the EIB.

On those grounds,

THE GENERAL COURT (Third Chamber)

hereby:

1.      Dismisses the action;

2.      Orders IO to pay the costs.

Kowalik-Bańczyk

Cassagnabère

Pavelin

Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 21 October 2026.

T. Henze

S. Papasavvas

Acting Registrar

President

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*      Language of the case: English.